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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently decided its first public school stu1
dent free speech case in nearly twenty years. In that nineteen-year
period, the lower courts diverged greatly on the issue of off-campus
student speech. Where one court might hold that Internet-related
student speech should be restricted, another court looking at the
same set of facts but applying a different standard might hold that the
2
same Internet-related speech should be protected. As a result of the
increasing use and prevalence of digital technology, students are now
being punished for expression that would have previously escaped
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J.D. Candidate, 2011, Marquette University Law School. The author would like to thank
his wife, Katharine LaLonde, for her help, support, and comments on earlier drafts of
this Note, as well as the American Constitution Society for Law and Public Policy for affording him this opportunity.
The Court decided Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), nineteen years after Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Although the exact parameters of student
free speech rights are unclear, the rights of children are not necessarily coextensive with
those of adults. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“It does
not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be
prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.”). The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the government has a right to protect children outside school from exposure to certain kinds of expression.” Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the
Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1071 (2008); see, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968) (holding that it was constitutionally permissible for New York to restrict minors’ access to sexual written or visual materials while allowing the same materials to be
sold to adults).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 542 (2000) (describing inconsistent
lower court opinions in the area of student free speech).
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the attention of school officials. Despite an amicus brief from the
National Association of School Boards asking for the Court to provide
guidance on how a public school should balance students’ free
speech rights with discipline, safety, and effective learning, the Morse
v. Frederick decision shed little light on how far the school’s authority
4
extends beyond its borders. Therefore, the important question of
the constitutionality of a school’s decision to punish a student for
speech that does not occur on campus or at a school-sponsored event
5
remains disturbingly unanswered.
In the forty years since Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
6
School District, the Court’s seminal free speech case regarding students, many courts have become increasingly deferential to the deci7
sions of school administrators. These courts routinely ignore or
conduct a strained analysis of the standard articulated in Tinker, relying on overbroad readings of post-Tinker cases like Bethel School District
8
9
No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and now
10
Morse. In May 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
handed down a strained interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
11
in Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II).
Part II of this Note discusses the few Supreme Court cases that
have directly dealt with free speech in public schools to provide a
framework for analysis of Doninger II. Part III discusses the Doninger II
court’s decision and rationale. Part IV argues that the decision
presents a dangerous application of the case law that needs to be
reassessed and clarified. Part IV argues that the Second Circuit misinterpreted and misapplied Supreme Court precedent and lower
3
4
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See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1037 (commenting that a result of the digital age is that
“adults can see what minors are saying much more easily”).
See Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 45, 46 (2008) (arguing Morse provided little guidance to school administrators and leaves many unanswered questions as to which viewpoints are permissible); see also Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1028 (arguing the Morse Court missed the opportunity to
clarify whether public schools have the authority to restrict student speech off campus).
See Garnett, supra note 4, at 46 (describing the outcome and potential impact of Morse).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 528 (pointing out that since Tinker, “schools have won
virtually every constitutional claim involving students’ rights”).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
484 U.S. 260 (1988). Scholars have referred to these three cases—Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier—together as the “Tinker trilogy.” Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet:
Student Speech and the First Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 356 (2007). Dickler argues that
the lower courts’ confusion over the application of the Tinker trilogy “has caused many
inconsistent opinions, and in some cases, arguably unconstitutional results.” Id.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
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court decisions by developing and relying upon an erroneous standard. The Part then discusses the problems that such a flawed decision creates due to its potential wide-ranging applications. Instead,
all district courts should reject overbroad readings of the Supreme
Court precedent because they essentially permit limitless restrictions
on students’ freedom of expression.
This Note concludes, in Part V, by advocating for courts to adopt a
narrow, objective test for defining whether off-campus speech meets
12
Tinker’s “substantial and material disruption” standard. Such an objective test should place a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality on the school, thereby making the school prove that its punitive decisions were more than arbitrary or retaliatory. Because
13
certain areas of this topic have been extensively explored elsewhere,
this Note will not delve into the problematic topic of off-campus
speech that could be deemed cyber-bullying, harassing, or threatening to the health and welfare of other public school students or officials.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: TINKER AND ITS NARROW
EXCEPTIONS
Tinker, the typical starting point for any discussion of student
speech, upheld the Tinker children’s right to wear black armbands in

12
13

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
For a discussion of these types of off-campus speech, see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector,
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000) (arguing that constitutional rights are routinely
trampled in public schools, “largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance and selfpreservation on the part of [school] administrators”); David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of
Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 201 (arguing that “[s]tudent Internet speech cases
present the courts with an opportunity to safeguard the protections of the First Amendment in the face of vanishing student rights and a fear of new technology”); Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold
in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2003) (concluding that while “student
speech rights are under almost constant assault today, voices of reason still exist among
the judiciary to check over-zealous educators in their efforts to quash violent, offensive
and otherwise disagreeable expression”); Sandy S. Li, Note & Comment, The Need For A
New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 65 (2005) (“Courts must ensure that Internet-related student speech will receive some form of protection, because the Internet is a unique medium . . . .”); Lisa M.
Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework for Educators Who
Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 640 (2000) (addressing “student
threats against teachers, schools, or fellow students, and the First Amendment issues that
may arise as educators struggle to deal with these threats”).
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school to protest the Vietnam War. The majority famously wrote
that while students may not have the same rights as adults, they do
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and ex15
pression at the schoolhouse gate.” The opinion went on to warn that
schools may not seek to impose conformity such that they become
“enclaves of totalitarianism” bent on “foster[ing] a homogenous
16
people.” In order to prevent such totalitarianism, absent a “specific
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
17
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.” The
Court found no “actual or nascent” evidence that the on-campus actions of the Tinker children interfered with “the schools’ work or of
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
18
alone.” The Court held that only student speech that “materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
19
of freedom of speech.” In other words, the Court established a twoprong standard: schools can only abridge on-campus student expression if the activity materially or substantially interferes with—or is reasonably certain to interfere with—the work and discipline of the
school or will result in substantial disorder or the invasion of the
20
rights of others.
While the Court did not define how or when its materially and
substantially interfere test would be met, many commentators have
21
written that the test is strictly limited to in-school activity. For ex14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). While Tinker is the typical starting point for student speech
discussions, it was not the first Supreme Court case to address the issue. For example, in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court wrote that because schools “are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943). However, before Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that public
school students had any affirmative free speech rights. Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights
Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2009) (citing Richard L.
Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, 40 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 567, 568–69, 580 (1970)).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added).
Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 512–13.
See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging
Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 271 (2001) (arguing the Tinker Court
never suggested a limitation to students' speech rights outside the school setting or that
schools could punish off-campus expression that did not reach the confines of campus);
Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First

June 2010] PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PATERNALISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1421

ample, the majority defined the purpose of schools in very narrow
terms by stating that “[t]he principal use to which the schools are
dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for
22
the purpose of certain types of activities.” Commentators have criticized subsequent decisions for being poorly reasoned and for consis23
tently siding with the schools, thereby eroding many of the protec24
tions provided by Tinker.
Nearly two decades after Tinker, the Supreme Court seemingly re25
versed course in Fraser. Fraser’s school suspended him and prevented him from speaking at graduation as a result of a sexual in26
nuendo-filled speech given at a school assembly.
The majority
narrowed the scope of students’ constitutional rights by stating that
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto27
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”
The Court noted, “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the
28
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” After conducting such
a balancing test of Fraser’s right to freedom of expression with the
school’s duty to protect and teach civility to its students, the Court
29
upheld the school’s restriction of his speech.
The Court’s opinion stressed that unlike the Tinker children’s
30
armbands, Fraser’s speech was not of a political nature. Rather, the

22
23
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29
30

Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 135
(2007) (arguing Tinker narrowly defined the purpose of schools and does not expressly
extend to off-campus speech).
Markey, supra note 21, at 135 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512).
See Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 840 n.26 (2008) (listing law review articles discussing the confusing nature of Supreme Court precedent in this area).
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 528.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 677–78, 687. Fraser gave this speech in front of his fellow high school students.
The speech was as follows:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to
the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for
A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school
can be.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
Id. at 685.
Id.
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Court looked to the importance of schools teaching students the
proper bounds of socially acceptable “habits and manners of civili31
ty.” Chief Justice Burger wrote that “vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public
32
school education” and that the objective of public education is the
“inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
33
a democratic political system.” To properly educate students on
these fundamental values, the Court felt that schools needed the
right to regulate and control student expression inconsistent with its
34
basic mission.
Although the Court did not overrule or alter the rule outlined in
Tinker, the majority ignored Tinker’s contention that an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over35
come the right to freedom of expression.” The opinion significantly
shifted the burden by calling for courts to defer to the decision of
administrators when deciding whether the questioned speech had
36
caused or would cause a substantial and material disruption. In
other words, the Fraser opinion suggests that judges can and should
make judgments about the relative importance of the speech at issue
37
when deciding such cases. The Court held that it was not only acceptable at times, but also highly appropriate, for public schools to
38
“prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”
Significantly, under Fraser, the vulgarity and offensiveness of speech
depends on the effect on the reader or hearer, rather than on the
39
message as it is “objectively read or heard.”
However, Justice Brennan’s concurrence significantly questioned
40
the scope of the opinion. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan emphasized that the Court’s holding concerned only a school’s authority
to restrict a student’s use of disruptive language in a speech given to a

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 681.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Limits on Students’ Speech in the Internet Age, 105 DICK. L. REV. 181,
188 (2001).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
Id. at 680-81; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 839 (suggesting the Court distinguished Fraser from Tinker without explicitly altering or adding to Tinker's holding).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
Paul J. Beard II & Robert Luther III, A Superintendent’s Guide to Student Free Speech in California Public Schools, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 396 (2008).
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688–89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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41

school assembly. In addition, Justice Brennan pointed out that the
majority’s opinion suggested, “[i]f [Fraser] had given the same
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
penalized simply because government officials considered his lan42
guage to be inappropriate.”
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court
upheld a high school principal’s decision to censor school-sponsored
student newspaper stories dealing with topics such as teen pregnancy
43
and the impact of divorce. The decision made a distinction between
a school’s requirement to tolerate unpopular speech and a school affirmatively promoting a viewpoint with which it disagrees by again
pointing out that the speech at issue was not political speech like that
44
involved in Tinker. Like Fraser and contrary to Tinker, the Court held
that schools are not constrained by the First Amendment and may
limit on-campus student speech, regardless of whether a substantial
interruption is likely to occur, as long as the decision is “reasonably
45
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”
However, the Kuhlmeier court qualified the scope of its holding by
specifically stating that its application was limited to “educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
46
school.” The qualification of the holding specifically indicates that a
school’s decision to punish off-campus student speech does not fall
under this narrow exception to Tinker. Therefore, schools must have
a stronger rationale than merely the existence of a “reasonable rela-

41
42
43
44

45
46

Id. (holding the government could not punish speech merely because it considered the
speech inappropriate).
Id. at 688 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
484 U.S. 260, 260, 263 (1988).
Id. at 270–71. Some commentators disagree with the assertion that Kuhlmeier narrowed
the holding of Tinker. For example, Bruce C. Hafen argues that “rather than weakening
the Court’s commitment to the constitutional rights of students, [Kuhlmeier] seeks to
strengthen students’ fundamental interest in the underlying principles of free expression:
the right to develop their own educated capacity for self-expression.” Bruce C. Hafen,
Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685,
685. While Hafen’s argument may have been what the Court intended at the time, lower
courts have not applied the holding in this manner in the intervening two decades. See
infra Parts III, IV.
Kuhlmeier, 260 U.S. at 272–73.
Id. at 271. Further evidence of the Court’s intention to narrow the scope of its holding is
its statement that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school.” Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
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tion to legitimate pedagogical concerns” for punishing such off47
campus speech.
The confusing nature of the Court’s holdings dealing with public
48
school speech remained until Morse v. Frederick. In Morse, a high
school punished Frederick for unfurling a seemingly nonsensical
banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored outing
49
to watch the passing of the Olympic torch. Although this case presented the Court with its first opportunity to allow freedom of student
expression off campus, it declined to limit the scope of schools’ au50
thority to the “schoolhouse gate.” Instead, the Court specifically rejected Frederick’s contention that the speech occurred off campus
51
and therefore should not have been restricted. Most significantly
for other instances of student expression that occur outside of the
schoolhouse gate, the Court also rejected the school’s assertion that
52
schools are broadly allowed to punish speech they deem offensive.
The majority rejected such an expansive reading because it “stretches
Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech
53
that could fit under some definition of ‘offensive.’”
Instead, the Court analyzed the facts of the case and held that the
speech at issue could be restricted because it occurred at a schoolsponsored event, could reasonably be attributed to the school, and,
most significantly, advocated use of illegal drugs. The Court held
that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
54
drug use” because such a message is “clearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the school’s educational mission to educate students
55
about the dangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their use.”
However, Justice Alito’s concurrence, which Justice Kennedy
joined, significantly narrowed the Court’s holding to speech concern56
ing non-political and non-social issues. Justice Alito wrote that the
opinion did not authorize any restrictions on student speech other

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Kuhlmeier, 260 U.S. at 273.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 400.
Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 855.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 856; Markey, supra note
21, at 139.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). The Morse decision was narrowed because the majority
needed Alito and Kennedy’s votes to obtain a majority.
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than those of the Tinker trilogy and certainly did not warrant censorship of any student speech “that interferes with a school’s ‘education57
al mission.’” Although the concurrence allowed censorship of Frederick’s message because it advocated illegal drug use, Justice Alito
made explicitly clear that such regulation “stand[s] at the far reaches
58
of what the First Amendment permits.”
None of these Supreme Court cases discusses the amount of deference that lower courts should give to schools’ increasingly frequent
decisions to punish a student’s “offensive” comments that are initially
made off campus but eventually find their way on to campus. Courts’
59
rulings on this issue continue to vary. Unfortunately, strained interpretations of the Constitution and precedent have appeared with in60
creasing frequency in recent years. These cases misapply precedent
and often improperly extend the application of Fraser and Tinker by
relying on a paternalistic approach to minors.
III. DONINGER V. NIEHOFF FACTS AND COURT OPINIONS
A. Facts
On April 24, 2007, Avery Doninger, a junior at Lewis Miller High
School (LMHS) in Connecticut, and other members of the LMHS
Student Council fought with school administration over the third rescheduling of “Jamfest,” an annual battle of the bands extracurricular
61
event. In response to the rescheduling, Doninger and three other
Student Council members sent an email from a school computer to
members of the community asking for help in convincing the admin62
istration to hold the event as originally scheduled. The email stated
that “[r]ecently the Central Office decided that the Student Council
could not hold its annual Jamfest/battle of the bands in the audito-

57

58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 423. Justice Alito worried about the application of the Court’s holding because
[t]he “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the elected and appointed public officials with authority over the schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result, some public schools have defined their educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by
the members of these groups.
Justice Alito specifically stated that such broad applications of the Court’s opinion should
be rejected. Id.
Id. at 425.
See infra Parts III & IV.
See infra Parts III & IV.
Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d
199 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id. at 44.
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rium” and asked that the recipients “forward [the email] to as many
63
people as [they] can.” Specifically, the email requested that the re64
cipients contact Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent. Thereafter, Karissa Niehoff, the Principal of LMHS, had a discussion with
Doninger regarding her disappointment that the students had not
65
come to her with their concerns. The district court found that the
influx of emails and calls that resulted from the students’ mass email
caused Niehoff and Schwartz to miss or be late to several school66
related activities on April 24th and April 25th.
On the evening of April 24, 2007, Doninger posted a blog message
on an independently operated, publicly accessible website that was in
67
no way affiliated with LMHS. The post began as follows:
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here [sic] is
an email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest [sic]. basically [sic], because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of
phone calls and emails and such. we [sic] have so much support and we
really appreciate [sic] it. however [sic], she got pissed off and decided to
just cancel the whole thing all together. anddd [sic] so basically we
aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going
to be after the talent show on may [sic] 18th. andd..here [sic] is the letter
68
we sent out to parents.

The blog post attached the letter the four student council members
69
sent to members of the community earlier in the day. The post then
reproduced an email that Doninger’s mother sent to the school administration in order to give others an “idea of what to write if you
want to write something or call her to piss her off more. im [sic]
70
down.”
Other LMHS students responded to the post by calling
71
Schwartz a “dirty whore” and calling for a “sit-in.”
The following morning, members of the school administration received more phone calls and emails and called a meeting with the
72
students who had sent the original email. During this meeting, administrators and the student council amicably resolved the dispute

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I), 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 44.
Id. at 45.
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 45.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 45.
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73

and settled on a date for Jamfest. To notify students and parents of
the dispute’s resolution, Niehoff published the new date of Jamfest in
the school newsletter, and the four student council students notified
74
recipients of the email sent on April 24, 2007.
Weeks later, well after the dispute had already been settled, the
75
school administration found out about Doninger’s blog post. In
fact, during court testimony, Schwartz admitted that “some days after
the meeting,” her adult son found the blog post while conducting an
76
Internet search for Avery Doninger. Schwartz’s son made the discovery and gave it to his mother, who alerted Niehoff to the finding
77
on May 7, 2007.
On May 17, 2007, Niehoff called a meeting and confronted Do78
ninger with a hard copy of the blog post. At the meeting, Niehoff
asked Doninger to apologize to Schwartz, show the entry to her
mother, and “recuse herself from running for reelection” as class sec79
retary. Doninger readily complied with the first two requests, but
refused to withdraw her candidacy. The administration thus declined
to endorse Doninger for the position and refused to put her name on
80
the ballot. Niehoff testified that she punished Doninger for three
reasons: (1) her use of vulgar language; (2) her “failure to accept
[her] prior suggestions regarding the proper means of expressing
disagreement with administration policy and seeking to resolve those
81
disagreements,” and (3) her decision to provide the blog’s readers
82
with inaccurate information about Jamfest.
Despite not being on the ballot, Doninger garnered a plurality of
83
the votes in the election through the write-in process. However, the
administration barred Doninger from taking her position and from
84
speaking at graduation. In response, Doninger’s mother alleged a
violation of her daughter’s First Amendment right to free speech and
85
sought an injunction voiding the election.

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 46–47.
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B. The Strained Interpretations of the District Court and the Second Circuit
The district court began its opinion by discussing Tinker, Fraser,
86
Kuhlmeier, and Morse. The court then looked at precedent and ana87
88
logized the facts of Lowery v. Euverard to those of the Doninger case.
In Lowery, a group of football players circulated a petition calling for
the removal of their coach and were subsequently suspended from
89
90
the team. The players contested their exclusion from the team.
The Lowery court held that “[p]laintiffs’ regular education has not
been impeded, and, significantly, they are free to continue their
campaign to have Euverard fired. What they are not free to do is
continue to play football for him while actively working to undermine
91
his authority.” The district court quoted the above passage with approval and stated that, “Avery does not have a First Amendment right
to run for a voluntary extracurricular position as a student leader
while engaging in uncivil and offensive communications regarding
92
school administrators.”
The court then went on to state that while it believed the facts to
93
be closer to those of Fraser than Tinker, it looked at and applied the
94
Second Circuit’s recent precedent of Wisniewski v. Board of Education.
Wisniewski involved an eighth-grade student who sent instant messages from his home computer to a number of school friends that contained an image of a pistol firing a bullet at the head of their English
95
teacher, Mr. VanderMolen, and stating “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”
The icon came to the attention of school officials when a student,
who had not received a message from Wisniewski, pointed out the
96
icon to the administration.
Subsequently, the police and school
psychologist both determined that Wisniewski had no intention of
97
carrying out any such threat and only meant the icon as a joke. Despite these findings, the superintendent suspended Wisniewski for
one semester for the violation of a student handbook provision that

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 211–15.
497 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2007).
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16.
Id. at 215 (citing Lowery, 497 F.3d at 599–600).
Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
Id.
494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
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forbade threats against school teachers and for creating a disruption
98
of the school environment.
The Wisniewski court agreed with the school’s punishment and
found that Wisniewski’s actions created a substantial and material dis99
ruption of the school environment. Although the speech at issue
occurred off campus, the court ruled that Wisniewski was not immune from school punishment because it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would find its way to the school, come to the attention of the authorities, and substantially and materially disrupt the
100
administration of the school.
The court went on to find it irrelevant that the icon was determined to be a joke because schools “have
significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the
101
[Supreme Court’s] standard allows.”
Because the speech did, in
fact, reach the school, the court did not rule on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would come to the attention of
102
school officials.
The Doninger I district court then rejected Doninger’s contention
that the holding of Wisniewski should be limited to the Tinker frame103
work and not Fraser. The court found that the blog constituted oncampus speech and could be punished under the exception outlined
in Fraser because its content “was related to school issues, and it was
reasonably foreseeable that other LMHS students would view the blog
104
and that school administrators would become aware of it.” The dis105
trict court then ruled against Doninger on the merits.
On appeal, Doninger argued that the school could not regulate
her speech because it occurred squarely within the confines of her
own home and did not create a reasonably foreseeable risk of sub106
stantial disruption of the school environment. The school, on the
other hand, asserted that in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit had implicitly affirmed that schools can punish off-campus speech that they
deem offensive if the speech is likely to come to school authorities’
107
attention.

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216 n.11 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.
2008).
Id. at 217.
Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. at 199.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
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The court of appeals rejected a bright-line territorial approach
and implicitly relied heavily upon Fraser's ruling against plainly of108
fensive speech. The court then rejected the school’s broad reading
of Wisniewski, yet affirmed that a student may be disciplined for offcampus speech that “foreseeably create[s] a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment” when the speech may also fore109
seeably reach campus.
The court reasoned that if Doninger’s
speech had occurred on campus, the language chosen would have
fallen squarely within Fraser, and authorities could have prohibited
the speech to discourage the future use of similar inappropriate lan110
guage.
The court of appeals held that the case’s facts satisfied Tinker and
Wisniewski for three reasons. First, Doninger’s choice of words satisfied Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard and disrupted efforts to re111
solve the ongoing dispute.
The court cited other students’ reactions to the post, placing special emphasis on the student who called
Schwartz a “dirty whore,” as evidence that Doninger’s “efforts to re112
cruit could create a risk of disruption.”
Second, the court asserted that the “at best misleading and at
wors[t] false” information provided by Doninger in the blog post led
to a substantial disruption in the form of a “deluge of calls and
emails” that caused Niehoff and Schwartz to be late to school-related
113
activities. The court stated that Doninger’s blog post posed a “substantial risk that LMHS administrators and teachers would be further
114
diverted from their core educational responsibilities.”
Finally, the court stated that extracurricular activities are a privilege and attempted to justify the school’s actions by analogizing the
115
facts to those of Lowery.
In the Second Circuit’s estimation, the
school’s actions could be understood as upholding school policy that
a “student who does not maintain a record of [good] citizenship may
116
not represent [the student body].”

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 49.
Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
There are three main problems with the Second Circuit’s opinion
in Doninger II. First, the opinion improperly, implicitly extends Fraser
to off-campus speech. Second, the Second Circuit rests heavily on
flawed reasoning, misstatements of precedent, and faulty analogy to
support its proposition that Tinker does not require an actual showing
of disruption. Third, the application of the decision could have wideranging effects in other off-campus student speech cases. This section concludes by discussing the need for a clearer framework for
cases involving off-campus Internet speech and the problematic application of cases like Doninger.
A. An Improper Application and Extension of Fraser
While Doninger’s blog post may be characterized as plainly offensive by some, such language was not threatening and is often heard
117
on primetime television shows.
In fact, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “douchebag,” the ostensibly offensive language used by Doninger, as a slang term for “an unattractive or offen118
sive person.” Assuming arguendo that such speech is vulgar, it still
cannot be subjected to school sanction because the speech was
119
created and accessed off campus.
In addition, like the Fraser Court, the Doninger II court rationalized
that the school is responsible for teaching students the boundaries of
120
socially appropriate behavior.
The Second Circuit used Fraser to
justify the punishment because of that opinion’s suggestion that
judges can and should make judgments about the relative impor121
tance of the speech at issue when deciding such cases.
In Fraser,
Chief Justice Burger wrote that “vulgar speech and lewd conduct is
117

118
119

120
121

Popular teenage shows, such as Family Guy and South Park, routinely air such language.
For example, South Park aired an episode entitled “Douche and Turd” before the 2004
presidential election. South Park: Episode 119 (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct.
27, 2004). In the 2006 season of Family Guy, the term was often used, including in the
season finale, where the President of the United States’ name was “Douchebag.” Family
Guy: Episode 30 (FOX television broadcast May 21, 2006).
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 348 (10th ed. 1993).
Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU of Connecticut, in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp.
2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3: 07-cv-1129).
Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 48.
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680–81 (1986); see also Denning &
Taylor, supra note 23, at 840 (arguing the Supreme Court suggested administrators and
judges can make judgments about the relative importance of speech when it distinguished the Tinkers' political acts from Fraser's speech).
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wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education” and that the objective of public education is the “inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
122
democratic political system.”
The Second Circuit, however, broadened the scope of Fraser beyond the Court’s intent of allowing
schools to punish on-campus speech that is threatening or highly offensive. Nowhere in the Fraser opinion does the majority extend a
school’s right to punish students for offensive and lewd behavior to
non-disruptive off-campus speech, regardless of its lewdness or vulgar123
124
ity.
Rather, the opinion’s emphasis on venue implies the exact
125
opposite.
Moreover, the Second Circuit failed to cite or adhere to Justice
Alito’s concurrence in Morse, which clarifies that school officials do
not have “unfettered latitude to censor student speech under the rubric of ‘interference with the educational mission’ because that term
126
can be,” and indeed was in Doninger’s case, “easily manipulated.”
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to have judges “who are removed
from popular teen culture” decide what off-campus speech can be
127
considered lewd or indecent, as these standards constantly evolve.
The notion that schools play an important social role in protecting minors from sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech does not
apply to a blog that is written and accessed exclusively off campus.
Such a rationale cannot be used for punishment because it fails under all three of Tinker’s narrow exceptions. Unlike Fraser’s speech,
Doninger’s blog post occurred off campus and did not take place at a
school assembly. Unlike Kuhlmeier’s newspaper, members of the
general public could not reasonably perceive the blog post to bear
the school’s imprimatur. Unlike Morse’s banner, the blog post did
not promote the use of illegal drugs. These exceptions are the only
ones carved out of the Tinker standard by the Supreme Court and
128
stand at the “far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.” All

122
123
124

125
126
127
128

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)); see
Garnett, supra note 4, at 52–53.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 4.
The statement “[a] high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit
monologue” implies a geographic limitation to the Fraser holding. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at
685.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 4 (arguing the Supreme Court did not intend
for Fraser to apply to off-premises speech).
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
Li, supra note 13, at 101.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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other restrictions of student speech should be presumptively unconstitutional. Even accepting the school’s premises for punishment as
truth, in this instance only Doninger’s parents should have the right
to punish her for inappropriate language and non-constructive
means of resolving a dispute because Doninger wrote the “offensive”
post entirely off campus and did not access the site using school
property.
Lastly, the facts of this case are more analogous to Tinker because
the blog post—while arguably containing inappropriate language—
was essentially political speech made while off campus. The blog post
can be characterized as political speech in that it criticized the actions
of those in authority, the school administrators, for a governance decision, the postponement of Jamfest. Unlike the sophomoric assembly speech given by Fraser, Doninger’s blog post regarding her disagreement with school administration is essentially political speech
and cannot and should not be equated with cases dealing with van129
130
dalism and threats to school personnel.
Arbitrary actions such as those of Niehoff and the school administration instead accomplish the exact opposite of their intent. One
commentator notes that “[a]llowing the marketplace of ideas to flourish at school and on the Internet helps prepare students to be participants in democracy that cherishes the free exchange of ideas and di131
versity of viewpoint.” The administration’s voiding of a democratic
school election, which Doninger won through a write-in campaign,
teaches students never to voice their opinion, never to attempt to
mobilize their peers around what they may see as an erroneous or unjust administrative decision, and never to disagree with authority figures in any manner. Such a message is contrary to the spirit of Fraser
in that it does not inculcate the “fundamental values necessary to the
132
maintenance of a democratic political system.”

129

130

131
132

See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying injunction to student expelled for publishing an article on how to hack into the school's computers in an underground school newspaper).
See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
the school's decision to punish a student for creating and transmitting a drawing depicting the shooting of a teacher).
Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1078.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).

1434

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:5

B. Faulty Analysis of Tinker’s “Material and Substantial Disruption Test”
This case and others like it improperly extend the bounds of Tinker beyond what was intended by the Supreme Court. A student does
not abandon her First Amendment rights merely by attending public
school and discussing school-related topics or activities while off
campus. Tinker was not meant to apply outside of the schoolhouse
gate, as its holding readily indicates. However, even if Tinker did apply that broadly, Doninger’s blog post did not satisfy Tinker’s requirement for a material and substantial disruption of the school en133
vironment.
Contrary to the statements of administrators, the blog post did not
threaten to disrupt ongoing efforts to resolve the dispute because the
dispute was resolved the very next day. In fact, the blog post may
have helped speed up the resolution of the dispute. One could argue
that the increased number of calls and emails received from concerned parents and students—that may or may not have been a result
of the blog post—could have led to a more rapid resolution of the issue than would have otherwise occurred. This “undifferentiated risk”
of possible disruption of the school environment never rose to the
level of being “substantial” because the school did not cancel any
classes and did not have to expend any additional resources to investigate any sort of threat, and no student undertook disruptive action
or behavior in response to either the blog post or email. Like Tinker,
although the students were a bit “riled up,” no sit-in took place and
no other disruptive behavior occurred. Rather, in order for a reasonable jury to find a material and substantial disruption, “the disruption would have to be so severe as to cause, or to threaten to cause,
consequences such as class cancellations, widespread disorder, violence, or student disciplinary action, or to render teachers ‘incapa134
ble of teaching or controlling their classes.’” Doninger’s blog post
did nothing of the sort and therefore fails under Tinker.
The court also failed to address a major inconsistency in Doninger’s situation. Although the school punished Doninger for the blog
post, the majority of the disturbance occurred as a result of the oncampus email. While the school could clearly punish Doninger and
the other students for their initial email because of the use of school
135
equipment, she received no repercussion for this action. Instead,
133
134
135

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 10 (citing Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001)).
Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007).
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the school punished her exclusively for the blog posting. The court
realized the weakness of this argument and attempted to justify this
position on the basis that Niehoff and Schwartz were late to a few
136
meetings.
However, receiving calls from parents and other concerned citizens on a matter of both school and community importance is an essential part of a school administrator’s position. The
court should not have allowed this poor excuse to justify the school’s
punishment of a student expressing views that the Court did not support.
In addition, Doninger should not have been punished for the
words used and actions threatened by other students. If Doninger
had used the word “douchebag” to describe a student, rather than
the administration at large, it is highly unlikely that she would have
been stripped of her nomination to run for student council.
Schwartz’s actions suggest that she and her son were on the hunt for
Avery Doninger and no one else. The court conveniently ignored the
fact that the dispute had been easily defused and resolved weeks prior
137
to Doninger’s punishment.
In this light it becomes clear that Doninger’s punishment was an act of retribution. Such a witch hunt
should not be sanctioned and justified by the judicial system on false
pretenses. Instead, had the court conducted a proper Tinker analysis,
it would have found that the blog post did not substantially disrupt
classroom activities and that Niehoff was merely punishing Doninger
because she did not like what Doninger had posted on the website.
Such an action is an inappropriate and unacceptable justification for
limiting student speech under Tinker, Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School
138
139
District, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, and Justice Brennan’s
140
concurring opinion in Fraser.
Furthermore, both the district court and the Second Circuit twist
and misconstrue the holdings of other courts to support the proposition that Tinker does not require an actual showing of disruption.
The cases cited by the Second Circuit do not support its argument in
that the cases deal with speech that occurs or is disseminated at
141
school or school-sponsored extra-curricular activities, or involve an
136
137
138
139
140
141

Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d at 41.
See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 45.
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a student could not be punished
for a website created off campus).
496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that a student’s free speech rights were
violated when he was suspended for creating an online parody of the school’s principal).
478 U.S. at 688–89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Doninger II, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist.
No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008)), aff’g 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn.
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explicit or implicit threat to a student or faculty member. The district court’s opinion, for example, cites four cases for the proposition
that the school committed no violation of the student’s First
143
Amendment rights under Tinker. Ironically, all four of these cited
cases hold the exact opposite. Although all of the cases apply Tinker
to off-campus speech, the cited cases all failed Tinker’s material and
substantial disruption test, and these courts overturned the students’
144
punishments.
Finally, both the district court and court of appeals used a false
145
analogy between the facts of Doninger and Lowery.
In Lowery, the
players circulated a petition and specifically brought and intended
146
the petition itself to come onto campus. Doninger’s speech, on the
other hand, occurred entirely off campus, and the language used in
the blog—at the very least, one factor for which the school punished
Doninger—was not designed to come on to campus. Therefore, the
language used in the post should not have been used as a factor—in
fact, it seemed to be the strongest factor—in Doninger’s punishment.
If the administration had truly punished Doninger for the blog
post’s use of inappropriate language, her punishment should have
been the same as if she had said the same word while on campus. Although the post advocated on-campus action, the language itself was
not designed to come onto campus and represents the real reason for
Doninger’s punishment. It is highly doubtful that use of one foul
word permanently strips a student of school privileges, especially in
light of the fact that the case does not mention that the school doled

142
143
144

145
146

2007); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing article printed in
a student newspaper and distributed at school); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134
F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing petition circulated by members of the football
team while at school).
See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 51 (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216–17 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d at 41.
See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (holding that there was no nexus between the speech
and any substantial disruption of the school environment because no classes were cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, and the only in-school conduct was the showing
of the website to other students); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (holding that the punishment was unconstitutional because there was no
evidence that the speech interfered with the work of the school or impinged on the rights
of students); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that a document did not disrupt school or interfere with anyone’s substantial
rights); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(awarding preliminary injunction where punishment for derogatory language on a personal website likely demonstrated First Amendment harm).
See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 52; Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16.
Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585–86.
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out any punishment to the student who called Niehoff a “dirty
147
whore.” Although Niehoff listed other, pedagogical reasons for de148
nying Doninger the right to run for student council, such reasoning
came from the benefits of hindsight and legal coaching. It is much
more plausible that Doninger received punishment merely because
the administration disagreed with and took offense to her blog post.
Such capricious actions by school officials merely because they dislike
a student’s speech should not be judicially condoned.
The Doninger court’s reasoning also rests on a flawed analogy in
that the Lowery court wrote that the players were free to continue
their campaign to have Euverard fired, but were not free to play foot149
ball for him while actively seeking to undermine his authority. Doninger, on the other hand, was not “engaging in uncivil and offensive
150
communications regarding school administrators” at the time of
her punishment. Rather, as Niehoff requested, she had already apologized for the language used and any disturbance caused and had
discussed the situation with her mother by the time the student
council election took place. Unlike the situation in Lowery, where
151
Euverard reinstated the football players who apologized to him,
Niehoff refused to allow Doninger to run for student council despite
152
As a result, the Second Circuit not only applied, but
the apology.
rather extended the holding of out-of-circuit precedent as one of the
strongest rationales for its denial of Doninger’s First Amendment
rights. The use of this out-of-jurisdiction precedent relying on a
flawed analogy suggests that the court was merely looking for a rationale to justify the school’s punishment of Doninger.
C. The Reason to Care: The Potential Wide-Ranging Effects of the Decision
The Doninger case raises the question of how this important, albeit
flawed, decision will be applied by public secondary schools and universities. The Doninger decision implies that any criticism or foul language that occurs off campus is punishable once, and no matter how,
it is communicated to the school administration. This decision sets a
dangerous precedent by essentially permitting administrators to conduct limitless, “random” Internet searches whose results can be used

147
148
149
150
151
152

See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 51.
Id. at 46.
Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600.
Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586.
See Doninger I, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
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to punish students who have voiced their displeasure with school administration while off campus. If this holding is not clarified or
reigned in, other courts could reasonably interpret Doninger as allowing school officials to randomly search the Internet for evidence that
could be used to justify punishment any time that a school official has
153
a problem with a student. While schools are not to be totalitarian
154
enclaves “bent on foster[ing] a homogeneous people,” decisions
such as Doninger make it difficult to discern the difference because
they allow schools to punish students for any speech that the school
deems as creating even a remote risk of disruption.
In addition, the decision presents a new, problematic way of looking at the Internet as a weapon rather than a positive teaching tool.
Most importantly, the current forms of digital expression that occur
via email, text message, and instant message are no different from the
protected speech that occurs at malls, movie theaters, or other public
155
venues where students congregate.
However, the court essentially
disregarded the territorial argument (in-school versus out-of-school)
and allowed school administration to successfully claim that the Internet is always “in-school” and disruptive if its content is communicated to the school in any manner whatsoever. This interpretation of
Doninger poses extremely wide-ranging effects because such a broad
definition of on-campus speech would erase any boundary between
on-campus and off-campus speech. Such a distinction would deter
students from making any reference to school administration, teach156
ers, or fellow students.
Moreover, by affirming retributive actions
by school administration, students learn to be apathetic to decisions
of the administration, for voicing one’s opinion results only in punishment and loss of privileges. The increased tattling, retaliation,
and petty disturbances that would result from such an application of
Doninger would detract much more from the schools’ educational
missions than the use of a single inappropriate word used in a blog
post.

153

154
155
156

Similarly, Papandrea criticizes the Wisniewski decision for many of the same reasons, stating that:
[p]ermitting school officials broad authority to punish student speech whenever it
comes to their attention would grant them the power to punish students who engage in a political protest in the town square, write a letter to the editor in the local newspaper, or simply speak to their friends while walking around the mall.
Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1092.
Garnett, supra note 4, at 53 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1036–37.
See Denning & Taylor, supra note 23, at 882.
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In our current, digital age, such situations will likely arise with increasing frequency. Instead of condoning actions like those of
LMHS, courts need to understand that digital technology plays a vital
and critical role in the social and cultural development of teenagers
in that it allows and fosters self-expression, self-realization, and self157
Rather than classifying Internet-related student speech
reflection.
as always occurring on campus, courts should ensure that such
speech receives some form of protection because “the Internet is a
unique medium, offering anonymity and allowing people to easily
158
exchange ideas at the click of a button.”
In today’s increasingly
technological age, teachers and administrators should expect to read
and hear student criticisms of their actions and should not punish
the opinions unless they truly cause a material and substantial disruption of the school environment. The expansion of school jurisdictional authority that Doninger represents is disturbing because fundamental, constitutional rights are at issue. Although extracurricular
activities may be a privilege, they should not be arbitrarily taken away
by thin-skinned administrators because such punishment represents
another form of censorship.
Most importantly, free speech is a core value of our democratic
society and should be protected at all costs. The Beussink court correctly highlighted the importance of this issue by reasoning that:
One of the core functions of free speech is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging . . . .
Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech . . . which is most in
need of the protections of the First Amendment. Popular speech is not
likely to provoke censure. It is unpopular speech that invites censure. It
is unpopular speech which needs the protection of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment was designed for this very purpose.
Speech within the school that substantially interferes with school discipline may be limited. Individual student speech which is unpopular
but does not substantially interfere with school discipline is entitled to
protection.
The public interest is not only served by allowing [such] message[s]
to be free from censure, but also by giving the students . . . [an] opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution and the
159
Bill of Rights at work.

157
158
159

See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 1032–34.
Li, supra note 13, at 67.
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 1175, 1181-82 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Given the increasing prevalence of cases like Doninger, the Supreme Court should clarify some of the underlying assumptions of
Tinker and Fraser and restrict their application to speech conducted in
school or at school-related or school-sponsored events. Failure to
uphold free speech outside of public schools leaves students with no
adequate means of preventing a violation of their First Amendment
rights by school personnel.
V. CONCLUSION: DONINGER HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR A CLEARER
FRAMEWORK
The problems and inconsistencies of the Doninger opinion and its
possible far-ranging effects make evident that the courts need a clearer standard to determine when a student can be punished for offcampus Internet speech. While other commentators have proposed
solutions to the problem, none of the proposals go far enough to unequivocally cover speech such as Doninger’s. For example, Sandra Li
advocates that “[t]he Tinker standard is the most applicable standard
for internet-related student speech cases that do not involve school
sponsorship, because it is both broad and flexible enough to balance
the needs of a student’s right to self-expression and the school’s need
160
The
to maintain an orderly and safe educational environment.”
Doninger opinion, however, highlights the need for a more protective
standard by showing just how willing courts are to bend Tinker in such
a way as to justify a school’s action.
Justin Markey proposes a slightly different standard to determine
whether speech should be classified as on-campus or off-campus
speech, thereby determining the amount of constitutional protection
161
afforded the expression.
Markey believes that Internet speech
should be classified as off-campus if it was created “independent of
school activities, independent of the school’s resources, and [it] is
162
not a true threat.”
He argues that a school district should not be
constitutionally allowed to punish the student for such speech “unless
the student intentionally or recklessly caused the speech to be distri163
buted on campus.” While fitting for the majority of cases, this standard does not go far enough in that it may not afford Doninger’s
speech any protection.
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Li, supra note 13, at 102.
Markey, supra note 21, at 149–50.
Id. at 150.
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Off-campus criticism of school officials and administrative decisions, even using vulgar and profane language, should be constitutionally protected unless the student intentionally causes the vulgar
language itself to be distributed on campus. That is, a student should
not be punished merely for calling a teacher or administrator a vulgar name on the Internet. In addition, students should not be punished merely because the administration finds out about the post
and the advocated action occurred on campus. Such an action would
discourage all active and inactive disagreement with school administrators.
Rather, while it is necessary to balance the competing interests of
164
the school with the free speech rights of the student, the courts
should place a presumption of unconstitutionality on the censorship
of off-campus student speech even before conducting a Tinker analysis. Similar to Markey’s standard, the first question that should be
asked in situations involving the censorship of student Internet
speech is whether the speech occurred on or off campus. If the
speech itself occurred or was distributed on campus, courts should
then proceed with a Tinker analysis. However, if the speech occurred
off campus, the final inquiry should be whether the speech at issue
constituted a threat. If so, courts should continue to defer to the decisions of school administration in order to protect students and foster a positive learning environment. However, if the speech cannot
be said to be a threat, the next inquiry should be whether the speech
itself was designed to substantially and materially disrupt the school
or interfere with the rights of other students at school. If not, then
the questioned speech cannot constitutionally be censored. This final step is of utmost significance because if courts proceed directly to
Tinker, as Markey proposes, situations like Doninger can easily be manipulated post hoc by the school to justify their punishment of any
student for voicing displeasure with administrative decisions.
Therefore, as long as no threats are made and no harassment occurs that could reasonably spill over and result in substantial disruption within the school environment, Internet use at home should be
beyond the reach of school regulation regardless of the offensive nature of the language used. A rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality should result for non-threatening, non-harassing speech that
is created off campus on the student’s own property, not during
school hours, and for which there exists no evidence that the material
was accessed on school property, regardless of the type of punish164

Id. at 151.
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ment meted out by school administration. Schools should only be
able to rebut this presumption by affirmatively proving a material and
substantial disruption under Tinker. Undifferentiated fears cannot
and should not qualify to disregard a student’s constitutional rights.
Judges should not merely defer to and affirm the decisions of school
administrators. While a school district’s motive to prevent disruption
of the school environment that would hinder the learning process is
clearly a legitimate goal, it does not outweigh students’ off-campus
constitutional rights. In this manner both interests can be met;
schools can ensure the safety of their students and the spirit of the
Constitution can be fully respected to prevent schools from becoming
“enclaves of totalitarianism” bent on “foster[ing] a homogenous
166
people.”
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Not all commentators agree that off-campus speech should not be subject to school censorship. See, e.g., Renee L. Severance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the
Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2003) (examining and criticizing the use of the “geographic distinction of speech—that is whether
the speech occurred on campus or off campus—as a bright-line boundary to school jurisdiction with respect to Internet speech”).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

